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Abstract 
An  axiomatic  characterization  of  the  n-person  Kalai-Smorodinsky  bargaining  solution  is  presented, 
based  on  a  reduced  game  property.  An  extension  to  a  large  class  of  solutions  including  the  egalitarian 
solution  is  also  provided. 
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1.  Introduction 
In recent  years  the  concepts  of reduced  games  and  corresponding  reduced  game 
properties  have  proved  to  be  fruitful  tools  in  cooperative  game  theory.  Many 
well-known  solution  concepts  have  been  characterized  with  the  aid  of  such 
concepts. 
The  general  principle  is  as  follows.  Given  a  solution  concept  for  a  class  of 
games,  a  game  in  that  class,  and  a  subset  of  the  set  of  players  involved  in  that 
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game,  one  defines  a  new  (‘reduced’)  game  for  that  subset  of  players,  depending  in 
some  way  or  other  on  the  outcome  assigned  to  the  original  game-in  particular, 
the  payoffs  for  the  players  outside  that  subset  may  be  specified;  then  the  solution 
at  hand  satisfies  the  ‘reduced  game  property’  (or:  is  ‘consistent’)  if  the  players  in 
the  reduced  game  obtain  the  same  payoffs  as  in  the  original  game  at  the  solution 
outcome. 
In  the  area  of  transferable  (and  non-transferable)  utility  games,  by  now  most 
accepted  solution  concepts  [(pre)nucleolus,  core,  Shapley  value]  have  been 
characterized  by  appropriate  reduced  game  properties  -  see  Driessen  (1991)  for  a 
survey.  Not  all  of  these  properties  have  an  equally  natural  or  intuitive  economic 
interpretation,  but  they  do  conform  to  the  general  principle  formulated  above  and 
characterize  the  solution  concept  under  consideration.  Thus,  the  issue  has  two 
sides:  Given  an  appealing  reduced  game  property,  are  there  solutions  satisfying 
it?  But  also:  Given  an  accepted  solution  concept,  can  one  find  a  reduced  game 
property  satisfied  by  it? 
Also  in  the  area  of  bargaining,  reduced  game  properties  have  been  studied  - 
see  Thomson  (1990)  for  an  overview.  In  particular,  Lensberg  (1988)  gives  a 
characterization  of  the  Nash  bargaining  solution  based  on  a  very  natural  reduced 
game  property  called  ‘multilateral  stability’.  Unfortunately,  the  Kalai- 
Smorodinsky  bargaining  solution  (Kalai  and  Smorodinsky,  1975;  Raiffa,  1953) 
does  not  satisfy  this  property.  Therefore,  in  this  paper  we  propose  a  different 
reduced  game  property  for  bargaining  solutions,  which  is  satisfied  by  the  Kalai- 
Smorodinsky  solution.  Furthermore,  a  characterization  based  on  this  property  is 
given.  The  property  is perhaps  most  closely  related  to  Thomson’s  (1983)  axiom  of 
monotonicity  with  respect  to  changes  in  the  number  of  agents. 
Section  2  presents  the  reduced  game  property  and  the  axiomatic  characteriza- 
tion  of  the  Kalai-Smorodinsky  solution.  Furthermore,  by  weakening  the  axioms 
this  characterization  is  extended  to  a  large  class  of  solutions  including  the 
egalitarian  solution.  Section  3  concludes  with  a  remark  on  related  non-co- 
operative  models. 
2.  The  reduced  game  property  and  characterization  results 
Let  M,  a  finite  subset  of  the  natural  numbers,  denote  a  set  of  players.  Let  rW”: 
denote  the  Cartesian  product  of  ]M\  copies  of  Iw,  indexed  by  the  players  in  M.  A 
bargaining  game  for  M  is  a  subset  S  of  rWy satisfying  the  following  requirements: 
l  S  is  non-empty  and  compact,  and  contains  a  strictly  positive  vector. 
l  S  is  comprehensive,  i.e.  y  E  S  whenever  y  E  rW”: and  y  %x  for  some  x  E  S. 
The  interpretation  of  such  a  bargaining  game  is  that  the  players  in  M  try  to  reach 
an  agreement  or  ourcome  x E  S,  giving  utility  xi  to  player  i EM.  If  they  fail,  each 
player  ends  up  with  zero  utility.  The  conditions  imposed  here  on  a  bargaining 
game  are  standard  in  axiomatic  bargaining  theory.  Note  that  there  is  no  convexity 
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requirement,  but  remain  valid  if  it  is  included.  The  disagreement  outcome  has 
been  normalized  to  the  origin  (see  also  the  remark  below  concerning  the  scale 
invariance  axiom). 
BM  denotes  the  set  of  all  bargaining  games  for  M. 
Let  N  be  a  given  set  (population)  of  potential  players.  N  may  be  a  finite  but 
also  an  infinite  subset  of  the  natural  numbers.  Let 
&:=  U  BM 
OfMCh’,  M  is  finite 
denote  the  collection  of  all  bargaining  games  for  finite  subsets  of  N.  A 
(bargaining)  solution  on  B,  is a  function  cp on  B,  with  q(S)  ES  for  all  S E B,. 
Two-person  bargaining  games  were  introduced  by  Nash  (1950),  while  the  idea  to 
consider  a variable  number  of players,  is, in this context,  due  to Thomson  (1983). 
The  axiomatic  approach  to  bargaining  implies  formulating  ‘reasonable’  properties 
or  axioms  for  bargaining  solutions,  and  characterizing  solutions  by  these  axioms. 
Here,  we  are  interested  in  the  K&i-Smorodinsky  solution  K  defined  as follows 
(cf.  Raiffa,  1953;  Kalai  and  Smorodinsky,  1975).  For  S E BM  let  the  utopia  point 
u(S)  E  lRy be  defined  by 
u,(S)  : = yg  xi 
for  all i E M.  Then  K(S)  is the  maximal  point  of S on  the  line  segment  connecting 
u(S)  and  the  origin.  Let  W(S)  : =  {x  E S 1  there  is no  y E S with  y > x}  denote  the 
weakly  Pareto  optimal  subset  of  a  bargaining  game  S.  It  is  straightforward  to 
verify  that  K  satisfies  the  following  three  ‘standard’  axioms  for  a solution  cp on  B,: 
Weak  Pareto  Optimality  (WPO):  cp(S) E W(S)  for  all  S E B,. 
Anonymity  (AN):  For  every  finite  MC  N,  all  i, j E  M,  and  all  S,  T E  BM  such 
that  T  arises  from  S  by  interchanging  the  ith  and jth  coordinates  of  the  points  of 
S,  we  have:  vi(S)  = qj(T),  cpj(S) =  cp,(T),  and  (pk(S) = (pk(T)  for  all  k f  i, j. 
Scale  invariance  (SI):  For  every  finite  subset  M of N and  every  vector  a E rWy, we 
have  cp(aS) = up(S),  where  (ux)~ := uixi  for  all  x E rW”:  and  i EM,  and  aS := 
{ax\xES}. 
As  is well  known  and  obvious,  the  Kalai-Smorodinsky  solution  does  not  satisfy 
the  stronger,  version  of  WPO  defined  by requiring  the  solution  outcome  to  be  not 
even  weakly  dominated. 
Anonymity  requires  that  the  names  of  the  players  do  not  matter. 
The  usual  formulation  of  Scale  Invariance  contains  a  ‘translation  invariance’ 
part:  here,  this  part  is implicit  by  the  normalization  of  the  disagreement  point  to 
the  origin. 
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Homogeneity  (HOM):  For  every  finite  subset  M  of  N  and  every  vector  a E  rW”: 
with  ai  =  uj  for  all  i, j EM,  we  have  cp(uS)  =  Q(S). 
In  order  to  formulate  the  main  axiom  we  first  need  to  introduce  the  concept  of  a 
reduced  game.  Let  L  and  M  be  non-empty  finite  subsets  of  N  with  L  CM.  Let 
SEB”.  For  xE[W”,  X,  denotes  the  vector  arising  from  x  by  deleting  the 
coordinates  in  ME,  i.e.  the  projection  of  x  on  [wL.  Then  S,  denotes  the 
bargaining  game  {x~  (X E  S}  in  BL.  Let  x E  S,  x #  0,  xL #  0.  Let 
h(S,,x,):=min{hEIW+  )x,EhS,}. 
The  reduced  game  of  S  with  respect  to  L  and  x  is  the  following  bargaining  game 
for  L: 
Sx, := /q&s,, XL)S, 
Note  that  xL  is  an  element  of  the  weakly  Pareto  optimal  subset  of  S*,.  The 
reduced  game  SF  is  a  multiple  of  the  game  the  players  in  L  would  be  able  to  play 
if  the  players  in  M  outside  L  could  be  sent  off  with  nothing.  This  multiple  is 
chosen  in  such  a  way  that  the  players  outside  L  may  still  obtain  their  payoffs 
according  to  the  original  outcome  x,  while  leaving  a  weakly  Pareto  optimal 
outcome  xL  for  the  players  in  the  reduced  game.  The  reduced  game  property 
requires  of  a  solution  cp to  pick  this  point  xL  in  the  reduced  game  if x  is  chosen  in 
the  original  game.  Thus: 
Reduced  Game  Property  (RGP):  For  all  non-empty  finite  subsets  L  C M  of  N  and 
all  SE  B”:  if  q(S),  ZO,  then  rp(ST”‘)  =  p(S),. 
For  a  homogeneous  solution  an  interpretation  of  RGP  is  as  follows.  Consider  the 
games  S,  as  prenegotiations  of  the  coalitions  L  C M.  RGP  then  requires  that  the 
final  solution  outcome  for  the  grand  coalition  be  proportional  to  each  of  the 
coalitional  prenegotiation  outcomes,  i.e.  that  the  established  power  proportions 
are  preserved.  This  distinguishes  RGP  from  the  multilateral  stability  axiom  of 
Lensberg  (1988),  where  the  reduced  game  is  constrained  by  the  payoffs  of  the 
‘deleted’  players.  For  a  given  game,  recursive  application  of  RGP  in  fact  learns 
that  for  each  smaller  game  arising  if  a  subset  of  the  players  were  absent,  the 
payoffs  of  the  remaining  players  are  in  the  same  fixed  proportion.  Proportional 
solutions  (Kalai,  1977),  which  include  the  egalitarian  solution  (see  below), 
obviously  satisfy  RGP.  We  do  not  claim  that  this  is  a  natural  requirement  in  all 
situations;  but  then  again,  we  do  not  claim  that  the  Kalai-Smorodinsky  solution 
or  proportional  solutions  are  appropriate  in  all  situations. 
It  is  easy  to  verify  that  the  Kalai-Smorodinsky  solution  K  satisfies  RGP.  This  is 
a  direct  consequence  of  the  fact  that  the  utopia  point  of  a  game  S,  is  the 
projection  of  the  utopia  point  of  S.  See  Fig.  1 for  an  illustration  with  M = {1,2,3} 
and  L  = {1,2}.  Moreover,  if  the  population  contains  at  least  three  players,  the 
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Fig.  1.  The  Kalai-Smorodinsky  solution  has 
the  reduced  game  property. 
k 
Fig.  2  Proof  of  Theorem  1. 
Theorem  1.  A  solution  on  B,  (INI > 2)  satisfies  Weak  Pareto  Optirnality, 
Anonymity,  Scale  Invariance,  and  the Reduced  Game  Property,  if and  only  if  it is 
the  Kalai-Smorodinsky  solution. 
Proof.  We  have  already  remarked  that  K  satisfies  the  four  axioms.  Let  now  cp be  a 
solution  satisfying  the  four  axioms.  We  will  first  prove  that  if  IMl  =  2  and  S E  B”, 
then  q(S)  =  K(S). 
Let  M  =  {i,  j}  and  S E  BM (cf.  Fig.  2).  By  SI,  we  may  assume  q(S)  =  u,(S)  =  1. 
Let  kEN\M  and 
T  : = convex  hull(S  U  {e”})  C  lRy.‘3k’ 
where  eo =  e” =  0  and  e:  =  1.  By  WPO  and  AN  we  have 
4~i(Tti,k))  =  ~k(‘Z’ci,k)) =  Vj(T,j,,,)  =  pk(T,,,,,)  = +  . 
By  RGP  and  SI  it  follows  that  cp,(T)  =  cpi(T),  and  applying  RGP  and  SI  again,  we 
obtain  q(s)  =  K(S). 
If  /M/=1  and  SEB”,  then  p(S)  =  K(s)  by  WPO  of  q. 
Let  now  /MI  >2  and  S E  BM  with  (without  loss  of  generality  by  SI)  ui(S)  =  1 
for  every  i E  M.  Let  i,j  E M,  then  qi(i(sCi,,)) =  q(S,i,j,)  by  the  above  and  SI. 
Hence  by  RGP:  cp,(S) =  q(S).  Since  this  holds  for  all  i, j E  M,  we  conclude  by 
WPO:  $‘(S)=K(S).  0 
Theorem  1 does  not  hold  if there  are  only  two  players  in  the  player  population  N. 
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Game  Property;  for  Pareto  optima1  solutions  (like  the  two-player  Kalai- 
Smorodinsky  solution)  this  is true  not  only  in  the  sense  as defined  in  this  paper, 
but  also  in the  sense  of Lensberg  (1988).  Lensberg  distinguishes  between  Bilateral 
and  Multilateral  Stability.  Similarly,  we  introduce  the  following  weakening  of 
RGP. 
Weak  Reduced  Game  Property  (WRGP):  For  all  non-empty  finite  subsets  L  and 
M  of  N  with  L  CM  and  IL] = 2  and  all  SE  B”:  #T”‘)  = BOB, 
By  going  over  the  proof  of  Theorem  1,  the  following  result  is immediate. 
Theorem  2.  A  solution  on  B,  (INI >  2)  satisfies  Weak  Pareto  Optimality  , 
Anonymity,  Scale  Invariance,  and  the  Weak  Reduced  Game  Property,  if  and  only 
if  it is  the  Kalai-Smorodinsky  solution. 
Call  a  solution  rp on  BN  Strongly  Individually  Rational  (SIR)  if  q(S)  > 0 for  all 
non-empty  subsets  M  of  N  and  all  S E B”.  Then  we  have: 
Lemma  1.  Let  cp be  a  Strongly  Individually  Rational  and  Homogeneous  solution 
on  B,,,  satisfying  the  Reduced  Game  Property,  and  let  M  be  a  non-empty  finite 
proper  subset  of  N.  Let  S E  B”.  Then  q(S)  E  W(S). 
Proof.  Take  k E NM,  and  let  T E  BMUfk’  be  the  convex  hull  of  S  and  the  kth 
unit  vector  in  R~“(k’.  By  SIR,  (p(T),  #  0.  By  RGP, 
cp(h(S> 40,)s)  = (P(T),  EW(h(S,  q(T),)S) 
So  by  HOM,  p(S)  E W(S).  q 
An  immediate  consequence  of Lemma  1 and  Theorem  1 is the  following  theorem. 
Theorem  3.  Let  N  be  infinite.  A  solution  on  B,  satisfies  Anonymity,  Scale 
Invariance,  the  Reduced  Game  Property,  and  Strong  Individual  Rationality,  if and 
only  if  it is the  Kalai-Smorodinsky  solution. 
The  infiniteness  of  N  in  Theorem  3  is  essential.  Consider,  for  example,  the 
solution  cp on  Bt1,2,3j,  defined  by  p(S):=  K(S)  if  SE  BM  and  (MI ~3,  and 
q(S):=  +K(S)  if SEB  (1s2s3)  This  solution  satisfies  all the  axioms  in the  theorem.  . 
Thomson  (1983)  uses  the  following  axiom  in  a  characterization  of  the  Kalai- 
Smorodinsky  solution. 
Monotonicity  with  respect  to  changes  in  the  number  of  agents  (MON):  For  all 
non-empty  finite  subsets  L  C  M  of  N  and  all  S E BL,  T E  B”,  if  S =  T,,  then 
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It can  be  verified  easily  that  for  Scale  Invariant  solutions  RGP  implies  MON.  The 
converse,  however,  is not  true.  We  construct  an  example  as follows.  Let  M  be  a 
non-empty  finite  subset  of  N,  and  let  n E N.  Define  a function  f  : [0, l] +  [WM  by 
f;(t):=tif  iEM,  i#  IZ and f,(t)  :=  t2, for  all t E [0, 11. For  S E BM with  u,(S)  =  1 
for  all  i E M,  let  p(S)  be  the  unique  point  of  W(S)  on  the  graph  off;  cp is then 
defined  on  all  of  BM  be  requiring  it  to  be  Scale  Invariant.  We  leave  it  for  the 
reader  to  verify  that  this  solution  satisfies  MON  but  not  RGP.  Thus,  under  Scale 
Invariance,  MON  is weaker  than  RGP.  This  is also  suggested  by  the  fact  that  in 
his characterization  of the  Kalai-Smorodinsky  solution  Thomson  (1983)  essential- 
ly  needs  an  infinite  population  of  agents. 
We  conclude  this  section  with  an  extension  of  Theorem  3.  For  an  infinite 
population  N we will describe  all solutions  on  B,  satisfying  SIR,  HOM,  and  RGP. 
To  this  end,  let  i,  denote  the  minimum  of  N,  and  let  PN denote  the  set  of  all 
vectors  p  E  iwy+  with  pi,  =  1  (this  is  just  a  suitable  normalization).  Let 
r  : PN-+  PN be a map  associating  with every  p  E  PN a vector  T(P)  E  PN such  that, 
for  all p,  p E  PN and  all finite  subsets  M of  N,  if pM is a positive  multiple  of  FM, 
then  QT(P)~ is a positive  multiple  of  am.  By n,,, we denote  the  collection  of  all 
such  maps  7r. With  r  E 17,  we  associate  a  bargaining  solution  (or  on  B,,  as 
follows.  Let  SE  B”,  where  M  is a  finite  subset  of  N,  then  q”(S)  is the  unique 
point  of  W(S)  of  the  form  w(p),,,  (CI  E  R,,),  where  pw  is  a  multiple  of  the 
utopia  point  of  S. We  call  such  a solution  cpr a generalized  proportional  solution. 
For  n  being  identity,  cp” is the  Kalai-Smorodinsky  solution.  If  7r is the  constant 
map  assigning  the  vector  with  all  ones  to  every  p,  then  cp  n  is  the  egalitarian 
solution. 
It  is  easy  to  verify  that  for  every  rr E fl,,  the  solution  (pm satisfies  SIR  and 
HOM.  RGP  follows  by  the  special  condition  imposed  on  the  map  rr. Conversely, 
if cp is a solution  satisfying  SIR,  HOM,  and  RGP,  then  by  Lemma  1 it  is Weakly 
Pareto  Optimal.  Then,  the  proof  of  Theorem  1 can  be  adapted  to  show  that  cp is 
of  the  form  cp=. Summarizing,  we  have: 
Theorem  4.  Let  N  be  infinite.  A  solution  on  B,  satisfies  Homogeneity,  the 
Reduced  Game  Property,  and  Strong  Individual  Rationality,  if  and  only  if  it is a 
generalized  proportional  solution. 
Also  Theorem  1 can  be  extended  in  a  similar  spirit,  but  if  SIR  is not  required, 
then  so-called  ‘weighted  hierarchies’  (cf.  Peters,  1992,  p.  19)  may  arise  in  the 
population,  due  to  the  possibility  of players  with  zeros  in the  vector  p  E  IIN. The 
description  of  the  associated  solutions  is rather  technical  and  therefore  omitted. 
3.  Concluding  remarks 
Krishna  and  Serrano  (1990)  present  a  non-cooperative  implementation  of  the 
Nash  bargaining  solution  based  on  Lensberg’s  (1988)  multilateral  stability  axiom. 18  H.  Peters  et  al.  I  Mathematical  Social  Sciences  27  (1994)  11-18 
Similarly,  in an  earlier  version  of  this  paper’  a non-cooperative  game  is described 
of  which  the  unique  subgame  perfect  equilibrium  outcome  is  given  by  applying 
the  Kalai-Smorodinsky  solution.  The  subgames  of  that  non-cooperative  game 
correspond  to  the  reduced  games  defined  in  the  previous  section.  An  earlier 
non-cooperative  implementation  of  the  Kalai-Smorodinsky  solution  is  provided 
by  Moulin  (1984). 
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